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*De remuneratie van de raad van
bestuur aan het
begin van de 21^o eeuw*

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Abstract

This paper examines the remuneration package (2000) of the board of directors of 125 Belgian Euronext listed companies. The figures shed some light on the different remuneration schemes used by large Belgian companies.

The first part gives an overview of the disclosure requirements. Section two analyses the corporate governance recommendations on the disclosure of information on the remuneration of board members. This part also includes a brief description of the number, composition and tasks of the remuneration committees.

Notwithstanding the mandatory rules, not all companies disclose the total board remuneration. As much as one company in five publishes incomplete or incorrect information in its annual report.

The average total remuneration package of the board of directors is 1,16 mln. Euros. However, some remuneration schemes significantly influence the average. The median value is 720.000 Euro. The Belgian board has an average of 10 members. The non-executive director is granted a fixed remuneration of approximately 12.500 Euro a year. As indicated in some other studies, performance related pay is rather rare. The size of the company, the composition of the board and the ownership structure influence the total amount. The larger the company, the larger the relative number of executive members and contrary to the general belief the larger the stake of the largest shareholder, the higher the board's remuneration. Notwithstanding these statistically significant interdependences, the explanatory value of the model is rather small. The author suggests to enhance the disclosure of the remuneration packages and to install a proper enforcement regime.

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