Working Papers

The effective enforcement of EU Capital Markets Law is critical for ensuring financial stability, protecting investors, and maintaining fair and competitive markets throughout the European Union. This document identifies key challenges in the current regulatory landscape, including the complexity of laws, the diversity of enforcement practices across member states, and the lack of harmonization in financial regulations. We propose a comprehensive approach to enhance enforcement effectiveness through simplification of the legal framework, adoption of preventive regulatory measures, and improved coordination among national and EU-level supervisory authorities. These strategies are designed to reduce the regulatory burden, facilitate compliance, and ensure more uniform enforcement across the EU. Key recommendations include:

1. Simplification of Regulations: Streamline existing laws and regulations to eliminate redundancies and clarify obligations, making them easier to enforce and comply with.

2. Preventive Approaches to Regulation: Shift the regulatory focus from a primarily reactive to a more proactive stance, emphasizing early detection of potential compliance issues to prevent violations.

3. Enhanced Supervisory Coordination: Foster closer collaboration among the EU's financial supervisory bodies to ensure consistent application of regulations and share best enforcement practices.

The ultimate goal of these recommendations is to create a more integrated, efficient, and effective regulatory framework for the EU’s capital markets, aligning with broader efforts to strengthen the European financial system and enhance its global competitiveness. This document lays the foundation for a series of actionable steps that policymakers and regulatory authorities can adopt to achieve these objectives.

In een “perfecte” wereld zouden allerlei juridische mechanismen, zoals voorrechten en zekerheden, maar ook pakweg schuldvergelijking of eigendomsvoorbehoud, die de gelijkheid van schuldeisers bij samenloop doorbreken, zinloos zijn. Immers, partijen die niet kunnen genieten van een (de jure of de facto) prioriteit zullen ex ante hun “prijs” om te contracteren verhogen als compensatie voor het hogere risico dat ze lopen (en vice versa). Daarom is het een “puzzel” waarom deze mechanismen, waarmee wordt afgeweken van het “pari passu” beginsel, bestaan. In werkelijkheid zijn er natuurlijk vaak goede economische redenen om bepaalde partijen, in bepaalde situaties, een prioriteit te geven (of ze achter te stellen).

In deze bijdrage wordt een conceptueel kader gesuggereerd waarmee kan geanalyseerd worden of een bepaalde juridische “afwijking” (zoals bijvoorbeeld de fiscale voorrechten) op het pari passu beginsel economisch gelegitimeerd is.

Doorheen de bijdrage zal geargumenteerd worden dat dit “kader” niet alleen gebruikt kan worden bij rangafwijkingen in de eerder strikte zin, maar ook voor andere juridische regels die het risico en de kosten van ondernemingsfalen verdelen, zoals beperkte aansprakelijkheid, (een cap op) aandeelhouders- bestuurders- of zelfs bankiersaansprakelijheid, etc. Meer nog, ik zal in deze bijdrage argumenteren dat het zekerhedenrecht en andere risicoverdelende regels elkaar noodzakelijk aanvullen om tot genuanceerde en economisch zinvolle juridische oplossingen te komen in een complexe wereld. Waarbij dan het ultieme beleidsdoel is om mensen te prikkelen maatschappelijk waardeverhogende beslissingen te doen nemen (i.e. het uitvoeren van een zinvolle economische activiteit, dan wel het stoppen met een zinloze economische activiteit).

Within the European Member States, it should now be possible to establish a limited liability company fully online. This study compares how the Directive which mandates online formation, has been implemented in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. In particular, it examines whether and, if so, how these countries approach the various cybersecurity risks involved in online formation.

The Directive considers these cybersecurity risks, however, the focus is mainly on the requirements regarding the availability of online formation and to a lesser extent the requirements pertaining to the authentication of the founders, as well as the authenticity and integrity of electronic documents. The primary emphasis of the Directive is strongly placed on achieving the objective of facilitating easier, quicker, and more time- and cost-effective company formation.

The approach taken by the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany in implementing the Directive and enabling online formation demonstrates a notable level of similarity. All have made sure to safeguard the traditional role of notaries in company formation in these countries. Despite the Directive's emphasis on availability, the primary concern for these Member States lies in ensuring the security of online formation. All impose strict requirements regarding cybersecurity and opted for the highest standards regarding authentication (assurance level 'high') and authenticity (qualified electronic signatures).

België heeft de geschillenregeling (gedwongen uitsluiting en uittredevorderingen tussen aandeelhouders) in 1995 uit Nederland gekopieerd. Maar terwijl die regeling in België meteen een groot succes werd, wordt zij in Nederland nauwelijks toegepast. Conventional wisdom zegt dat dit komt omdat men in Nederland conflicten tussen aandeelhouders liever via de enquêteprocedure bij de Ondernemingskamer (Hof Amsterdam) oplost. De Nederlandse wetgever wil de geschillenregeling niettemin succesvoller maken. Daartoe werd in november 2023 een wetsvoorstel, bekend als “de Wagevoe”, bij de Tweede Kamer ingediend. De Wagevoe wil de Ondernemingskamer, een in Nederland erg gerespecteerde instelling, in enige aanleg bevoegd maken om ook de geschillenregeling te behandelen. Mij viel de eer te beurt de Wagevoe door een Belgische bril bekeken te becommentariëren voor de jaarvergadering (november 2023, Amsterdam) van de Nederlandse Vereniging Corporate Litigation. Dit working paper is de schriftelijke neerslag van die oefening. Ik suggereer onder meer dat het toch niet vanzelfsprekend is de quasi-onteigening die de uitstoot (uitsluiting) is, slechts in één aanleg te laten behandelen; dat men beter tegelijk de enquêteprocedure had aangepast door gedwongen uitstoot/uittrede als eindvoorziening mogelijk te maken; en dat we het in België niet opportuun vinden dat de geschillenrechter vorderingen in bestuurdersaansprakelijkheid als samenhangend zou kunnen beschouwen met de geschillenregeling, iets wat wel de bedoeling van de Wagevoe is. Ik besluit met de korte suggestie dat in België ernstig bestudeerd zou moeten worden of het nuttig zou zijn ook de enquêteprocedure in het Belgische recht over te nemen.“

In deze erg essayistische, niet streng-wetenschappelijke tekst ontplooi ik enkele mijmeringen over de grote corporate governance-thema’s in Europa van de afgelopen 70 jaar. Geïnspireerd door een Amerikaans historicus (Gary Gerstle) onderscheid ik drie tijdvakken oftewel “governance ordes”: de naoorlogse periode tot eind de jaren ’70 als het tijdperk van de controlerende aandeelhouders en hun technocratische managers, de neoliberale jaren ’80 als een overgangsperiode waarin de eerste kiemen van voor de dominantie van de shareholder value in de jaren 1990-2010 de tweede orde- werden gelegd, en sinds ongeveer 2016 de doorbraak van een stakeholder/ESG-orde (in Europa, niet echt in de VS). Deze tekst werd in de eerste dagen van december 2023 geschreven, nog voor de maneuvers (vanaf januari 2024)van verschillende EU lidstaten om allerlei EU-wetgeving die als belastend voor bedrijven wordt ervaren, te proberen tegenhouden ondanks eerder bereikte politieke compromissen. Ondanks de backlash die in Europa ook gaande is tegen “stakeholderism” , de Green Deal en aanverwanten, ben ik ervan overtuigd dat de nieuwe evoluties niet onmiddellijk omkeerbaar zijn – CSRD zal men niet direct terugdraaien, om maar iets te zeggen, en ook zonder CSDDD zullen grote ondernemingen met supply chain due diligence geconfronteerd worden- zodat we in Europa de komende jaren niet alleen in een meer ESG-gericht klimaat zullen leven, maar ook de impact zullen blijven voelen van de tegenover 2015 gewijzigde geopolitieke situatie die onder meer een subsidiestroom voor bepaalde “strategische” industrieën met zich meebrengt, maar ook meer regulering voor sommige van die bedrijfstakken, en wat neerkomt op overheidsingrijpen op de overnamemarkt. Eén van de overkoepelende “boodschappen van deze -ik herhaal het: erg impressionistische- tekst is dat corporate governance-ontwikkelingen onmiskenbaar samenhangen met het algemene politieke en economische klimaat. Rechtenstudenten die in corporate law geïnteresseerd zijn, zouden daarom ook wat meer belangstelling voor die politieke en economische ontwikkelingen moeten tonen dan zij doorgaans aan de dag leggen.

Deze bijdrage spitst zich toe op het toepassingsgebied van de nieuwe wettelijke bepalingen inzake “Schulden van de consument” en besteedt daarbij achtereenvolgens aandacht aan het materiële, personele, territoriale en temporele toepassingsgebied van Boek XIX WER.

In deze bijdrage wordt de kwalificatie van bestuurders als ondernemingen besproken in het licht van de cassatiearresten en de daaropvolgende lagere rechtspraak. Om dit te kaderen wordt hierna eerst een schets gegeven van de meerderheidsopvatting die was gegroeid in de rechtspraak en de rechtsleer over de kwalificatie van bestuurders als onderneming. Nadien wordt de uitkomst van de cassatiearresten over het ondernemingsbegrip besproken. Er is ook kort aandacht voor de prejudiciële vragen die het Grondwettelijk Hof diende te beoordelen over de bestuurdersproblematiek. Vervolgens wordt aan de hand van recente rechtspraak over het ondernemingsbegrip onderzocht hoe de organisatievereiste nader wordt ingevuld, of niet ingevuld, door de hoven en de rechtbanken. Tot slot lichten wij het belang toe van een flexibele interpretatie van het organisatieconcept, alvorens tot enkele overkoepelende slotoverwegingen te komen.

Virtual influencers are a new type of social media influencers, deployed by commercial entities to endorse their goods and services across several social media platforms. Distinguished by their entirely fictitious nature, virtual influencers exhibit remarkably human-like attributes encompassing physical characteristics and personalities. The visual representation of existing virtual influencers is claimed to be facilitated by artificial intelligence, although it is uncertain if this technology is really used to generate their images. Virtual influencers promote products in a way that human influencers do, albeit lacking the essential authenticity required to provide a faithful recommendation. They are fake personalities; hence they cannot try the products they recommend, a characteristic inherent to their human counterparts. In addition, virtual influencer profiles are under complete control of commercial entities such as brands. The average consumer developed the legitimate expectation that influencers endorse products based on their personal experience and opinion, rather than just following instructions from brands. However, in case of virtual influencers, experience-based endorsements are replaced by the financial incentives of the entities behind them. The lack of a personal element makes virtual influencer advertisements inauthentic and incommensurable with consumer expectations. Problematically, the average consumer remains oblivious to the fictitious nature of virtual influencers, or worse, their orchestration by commercial brands. The glaring absence of transparency pertaining to these elements leads to a general deception of the consumer.

The protection of consumers against such practices is harmonised in the European Union through the Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices. This paper explores the application of the standards set by EU law on virtual influencers, which are fictional characters without a form of natural or legal personhood. It ascertains that the deployer of virtual influencers, in addition to the third-party seller of the endorsed product, is in some cases bound by the provisions of EU law in this respect. We establish that the deception of the consumer by highly anthropomorphised virtual influencer posts that do not disclose the ad, the virtual nature of the influencer, and the control of the trader, is per se an unfair market practice that is forbidden under EU law. In this paper, we also take a closer look at the liability distribution between the parties involved in the creation process of these influencers, alongside the respective sanctioning that may be imposed. By doing so, we uncover several hardships when it comes to the enforcement of EU law provisions against misleading content created by virtual influencers. In addition, the paper uncovers the obligations of social media platforms to assess the systemic risks arising from such profiles, while suggesting a couple of specific policy measures these platforms could take to strengthen the existing enforcement mechanisms of EU and national law.

This working paper is a draft of a chapter that will appear in J. KERCKAERT and S. GEIREGAT (eds.), Social Media Influencers and the #Law, Heverlee, LeA Uitgevers, 2024.

This working paper is a draft of a chapter that will appear in J. KERCKAERT and S. GEIREGAT (eds.), Social Media Influencers and the #Law, Heverlee, LeA Uitgevers, 2024.

The emergence of “finfluencers” in the financial sector has raised critical concerns regarding their influence, particularly in light of high-profile cases involving celebrities and regulatory scrutiny. A noteworthy trend among finfluencers is the routine use of disclaimers emphasising their non-financial advisory role. This article critically explores the legal risks from a financial law perspective that finfluencers seek to avoid with such disclaimers and the efficacy of such disclaimers in limiting or exempting finfluencers from civil liability. The analysis includes a specific focus on finfluencers specialising in crypto-assets, acknowledging the distinct regulatory challenges in this domain. The conclusion underscores the importance for finfluencers to exercise caution in their communications, emphasising that reliance on disclaimers alone may fall short in shielding them from potential administrative penalties and civil liabilities.

This working paper is a draft of a chapter that will appear in J. KERCKAERT and S. GEIREGAT (eds.), Social Media Influencers and the #Law, Heverlee, LeA Uitgevers, 2024.

In Belgium, it is well established that banks, when granting credit, have a duty to assess the borrower's creditworthiness. Failure to conduct a prudent assessment of a borrower's creditworthiness is considered a fault in a civil law context. Historically, there have been cases wherein banks were held liable by third parties when credit was granted to companies who were virtually bankrupt. Traditionally, the evaluation of a credit applicant's creditworthiness exclusively scrutinized their capacity for repayment. The European Banking Authority (EBA), in its Guideline of May 29, 2020, concerning Loan Initiation and Monitoring, mandates that banks, in the process of granting credit, must assess the borrower’s exposure to Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) risks. This prompts an intriguing inquiry into the potential role of these guidelines within the context of private law disputes. Specifically, this prompts the question of whether external entities possess the capacity to impute civil liability upon a bank in scenarios where credit is granted in breach of the EBA Guidelines.

The present research explores whether a failure to comply with EBA Guidelines, with a specific focus on the ESG-related obligations introduced by the EBA Guideline governing the initiation and monitoring of loans, could lead to a civil fault within the legal framework of Belgium. According to Belgian law, a civil fault arises if the behaviour in question (I) contravenes a particular statutory provision or (II) deviates from the conduct expected of a reasonably prudent person placed in the same circumstances.

Considering the non-binding nature of the EBA Guidelines, there is no doubt that non-compliance with these guidelines does not constitute a violation of a specific statutory provision, and therefore does not automatically result in a civil fault. Consequently, under Belgian law, the determination of a civil fault necessitates an evaluation of whether the conduct in question deviates with the behaviour expected of a reasonably prudent bank, operating under the same circumstances.

This paper argues that due consideration should always be given to the underlying purpose of the EBA Guidelines when assessing prudent conduct. In other words, a breach of the EBA Guidelines does not invariably lead to a breach of a bank's duty of care within the context of a private law dispute. The contention is that if the EBA Guidelines are not intended to confer rights upon banking customers, it would be inappropriate to presume that a breach of these guidelines automatically constitutes a violation of a bank's duty of care in a private law dispute between the bank and its customer.

By examining the interplay between EBA Guidelines and Belgian civil fault criteria, this research aims to contribute valuable insights to the legal assessment of financial institutions' conduct in the context of private law disputes. The findings of this study could provide guidance to policymakers, legal practitioners, and financial institutions in understanding the nuanced relationship between soft law instruments, such as EBA Guidelines, and their potential implications in the domain of private law.

This is Hans De Wulf's contribution to the liber memorialis of Didier Willermain, one of Belgium’s foremost corporate law attorneys and part-time academic, who died prematurely in 2021. In the text, De Wulf argues that it only makes sense to talk about a duty of loyalty for directors if one means a UK-style no-profit rule and that Belgian courts pay lip service to such a duty of loyalty for directors, but do not actually apply it and have indeed sometimes explicitly refused to apply it. De Wulf also argues that talk by German and Delaware courts about a duty of loyalty for shareholders verges on the misleading and, more importantly, that such a duty for (controlling) shareholders is not part of Belgian law and could not lawfully be construed by Belgian courts.

This is the draft of the contribution of Hans De Wulf to the liber memorialis of Didier Willermain, published by Larcier as Gouvernance et responsabilité. Mélanges à la mémoire de Didier Willermain (J.-Q. De Cuyper, B. Inghels et al., eds.), Brussels, 2023, p. 425-456.

Non-governmental non-profit organisations (NGOs) that try to influence ESG strategies of corporations, especially climate strategies, have recently, after buying a very limited number of shares in target companies, begun to pursue their campaigns through the use of shareholder activist techniques, such as submitting shareholder proposals and using the right of shareholders to ask questions of the CEO and give speeches at the annual general meeting. At the same time, some investment funds, especially pension funds, have in a limited number of cases engaged in “halo activism” i.e. shareholder activism campaigns that cannot be explained by a desire to increase investment returns. These organisations represent the interests of truly external stakeholders; their efforts go beyond trying to force companies to internalize their negative externalities. The article incorporates empirical research by Michael Bakker (University of Amsterdam) on the use of E&S shareholder proposals in European companies. Recent French, German and EU sustainability due diligence legislation creates leverage for such stakeholder organisations to influence corporate policies by forcing European companies to enter into a dialogue with these organisations. The French due diligence legislation in particular encourages general interest litigation by NGOs’s as the continuation of activism with other means, this has led to 10 pending court cases against French corporations. These new stakeholder tactics (shareholder proposals, climate/ESG litigation) are hard to reconcile with legal doctrines in certain European countries, especially the Netherlands and Germany, that hold that determining a corporation’s strategy should be the exclusive preserve of the (executive) board. Such a stance can be justified because the NGOs are not really shareholders: they buy a few shares for purely instrumental reasons and their interests diverge from those of shareholders. Nevertheless Hans De Wulf argues that the Netherlands and Germany should loosen their restrictions on shareholder proposals by only outlawing shareholder proposals that are too prescriptive on strategy, e.g. proposals that want to impose a specific quantitative emissions reduction schedule on companies. This would allow NGOs and halo activists to use the AGM as a transmission mechanism for the expression of the views of stakeholders and ESG-minded investors. Shareholder proposals are in any case a more appropriate channel through which to allow external, not financially invested stakeholders to influence corporate strategy than strategic ESG/climate litigation against companies, which is undesirable, and should in fact be inadmissible if it wants to impose strategic measures on companies that do not flow directly from binding, precise regulation but are based on the tort law concept of duty of care. Inconsistently, however, several European jurisdictions ban shareholder proposals on corporate climate strategies, while simultaneously enabling general interest climate strategy litigation against such companies. Everywhere, the new stakeholder tactics make life more difficult for boards, who have to balance incommensurable conflicting interests and values, thus taking the kind of decision that until recently was the preserve of politicians. At the end of the article, Hans De Wulf will venture to suggest that these development could have a negative impact on the board’s role in setting corporate strategy, that this problem may be made worse by the installation of another extra board committee (e.g. sustainability committee) and that probably, the new “political” and oversight roles of boards are more efficiently handled in a dual board system, with a “political” supervisory board that concentrates on oversight (risk management, compliance) and internalizing stakeholder interests, and a relatively small, coherent and insulated executive board that determines corporate strategy and executes it. But Hans De Wulf would be the first to admit that on this last topic- implications for the board’s strategy role and the board’s ideal structure- far more research by specialists in board dynamics is needed.

This article discusses some aspects of the completely new Companies Act (“BCCA”) adopted in Belgium in 2019. Even though the reform touched upon all aspects of company law and all company types, its main goal was to roll back Belgian goldplating of EU company law Directives and to turn the hitherto very rigid Belgian private company into a very flexible, contractual vehicle with little mandatory law applicable to it, except for rules on creditor protection and directors’ disclosure duties to make sure general meetings decide on issues on an informed basis. As part of this reform, the concept of legal capital (not just minimum capital requirements) was abolished for the private company. In order to allow Belgian company to better compete in the light vehicle competition, Belgium moved from the real seat doctrine to the incorporation theory. For public companies, the main reform was probably the introduction of loyalty shares, which (so far) did not succeed in attracting more listings to the Brussels stock market, but did allow existing controlling shareholders to cement their control with a smaller stake than before.

Except perhaps for the partially failed reform of the rules on changes to class rights, the reform was very successful in increasing legal certainty about many issues about which no authoritative case law exists. The rationale for the reduction of the number of company forms was less convincing, and the reform of the cooperative company was botched because of the conflicting demands emanating from the influential cooperative lobby. But in a way, the reform fought the last war (the light vehicle competition) while arguably not enough attention was paid to enabling venture capital and private equity contracting and the capital structures that go with these investments.

This contribution comments on the present state of Belgian securities law and will be included as a comparative law supplement to the second edition of the German Depotgesetz Kommentar (forthcoming, 2023) (first edition: Munich, Verlag C.H. Beck, 2012).

On 7 December 2022, the European Commission published its long-anticipated ‘EMIR 3.0’ proposal to improve the attractiveness of EU central counterparties (CCPs) and to foster the resilience of central clearing in the EU. In an attempt to reduce reliance of EU market participants on third country CCPs, the texts from the Commission propose substantial amendments to the 2012 European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and related EU legislative acts such as the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) . Central to the suggested reforms is the proposed requirement for certain EU market participants to clear at least a portion of ‘systemically relevant derivatives’ through ‘active accounts’ at EU CCPs, i.e. mandatory accounts at EU CCPs through which a certain level of central clearing activity would have to occur. This paper provides a first analysis of the proposed active account requirement and frames it against the post-Brexit EU drive to limit risks to the EU financial system that may follow from strong reliance by EU market participants on clearing services provided by UK CCPs.

This working paper reflects a presentation Louise Van Marcke delivered to the members of the Belgian Company Law Centre, during its PhD Seminar in April 2023. It addresses a subtopic of Louise's ongoing PhD research, which focuses on chains of intermediaries. This working paper is a normative and critical analysis of an ongoing discussion and should be interpreted as such.

In deze Working Paper analyseren Charlotte Meskens en Gauthier Vandenbossche de fiscale gevolgen van het wetsontwerp tot omzetting van Insolventierichtlijn 2019/1023. Om de evenwaardige toepassing van de nieuwe insolventieprocedures die door het wetsontwerp omzetting Insolventierichtlijn worden ingevoerd te garanderen, is het absoluut noodzakelijk dat de fiscale regimes voor de schuldeisers en schuldenaren worden uitgebreid tot die nieuwe vormen van reorganisatieprocedures. Daarnaast moeten ook sinds langere tijd in stand gehouden fiscale discriminaties worden weggewerkt. Indien de wetgever het behoud van de continuïteit van ondernemingen voorop wenst te stellen door tijdige reorganisatie, dienen ook de fiscale spelregels daarop afgestemd te zijn. Er moet dan ook over gewaakt worden dat de positieve economische effecten van reorganisaties niet gedwarsboomd worden door ongewenste fiscale (neven)effecten.

In theory, under the premise of freedom of will, insurers in Belgium are permitted to employ artificial intelligence (‘AI’) and big data analytics for segmentation purposes, enabling them to determine the ‘claims probability’ (i.e., the likelihood and severity of potential claims) for each prospective policyholder. This analytical approach empowers insurers to determine whether or not they should underwrite a risk, and if so, on what terms. A more extensive pool of policyholder data may increase the accuracy of the assessment of claim probability and surpasses the information asymmetry between the policyholder and insurer.

Although the implementation of AI and big data benefits insurers, pervasive segmentation through AI has some negative implications and could entail serious ramifications for policyholders if their risk is incorrectly calculated. In Belgium, the current insurance regulation does contain some existing restrictions that limit the freedom of insurers to use AI; nevertheless, these provisions fall short of protecting policyholders from inaccuracies in their risk assessments and thus from receiving incorrect premiums or conditions.

De problematiek van de vervroegde terugbetaling van commerciële kredieten door de kredietnemer heeft de laatste jaren een ware zondvloed aan gerechtelijke procedures ontketend, althans voor wat betreft de commerciële kredieten die niet onder het toepassingsgebied vallen van de wet van 21 december 2013 betreffende diverse bepalingen inzake de financiering voor kleine en middelgrote ondernemingen. De aanleiding hiertoe is de volgehouden daling van de interestvoeten. Veel kredietnemers die op een eerder ogenblik aan een hoge(re) interestvoet hun kredietovereenkomst hebben gesloten, wensen bij (verdere) daling hun lopende kredietovereenkomst vervroegd terug te betalen en een nieuw krediet te negotiëren aan een lagere interestvoet.

In deze Working Paper annoteren Dominique Blommaert en Othilly De Wilde de cassatiearresten van 27 april en 18 juni 2020.

In deze Working Paper annoteren Dominique Blommaert en Prescillia Algrain een vonnis van 6 augustus 2021 een vonnis van het vredegerecht te Mol, waarin de vrederechter de toepassingsvoorwaarden onderzocht van de rechtsfiguur “derde-medeplichtigheid aan andermans contractbreuk” en het schadeherstel dat hieruit kan voortvloeien.

In early 2022, a UK CCP canceled some $4 billion of transactions in the war-affected nickel market, triggering outrage from market participants that were in the money. The ‘nickel debacle’ illustrates that CCP risk management and loss absorption mechanisms may result in value redistribution among stakeholders. With CCP stakeholders located in multiple jurisdictions, crisis management decisions from a single-jurisdiction CCP supervisor may not pursue multi-jurisdictional financial stability or a fair balance of stakeholder interests across jurisdictions. Although the case for centralized supervision of EU CCPs thus appears strong, national concerns have persistently blocked increased centralization. This paper re-examines decentralized EU CCP supervision in light of the much-debated post-Brexit centralized EU supervisory regime for systemically important third country CCPs. Two new arguments emerge from this juxtaposition, revealing a dichotomy between the named supervisory regimes that appears hard to justify. First, a decentralized supervisory regime for EU CCPs is difficult to logically square with the policy arguments underpinning the post-Brexit EU supervisory system for systemically important third country CCPs. Secondly, the controversial location policy for ‘too systemically important’ third country CCPs could be more justifiable if the EU were to adopt centralized EU supervision of systemically important EU CCPs.

Working paper is available here.

Praised popular applications of artificial intelligence (AI) such as ChatGPT are merely a demonstration of AI’s potential in the business world. AI is on the verge of assuming a common role in the management of companies, since its steady emergence as a support tool for the administrative and judgement work of directors and managers. While only a handful of companies worldwide have attempted to appoint a robo-director, the general use of AI in corporate governance has proven to rationalize board decision-making, challenge groupthink and strengthen the independence of directors. Contrastingly, company law frameworks around the world remain rooted in exclusively human decisionmaking and deny the role of technology in corporate governance, resulting in inefficient regulatory strategies with regard to AI systems bestowed with governance powers. As a result, uncertainty exists about the legal permissibility and legal consequences of the implementation of AI in the corporate realm, which could discourage corporations from adopting AI, in spite of the technology being likely to enhance the business judgement of
directors.

Therefore, this paper attempts to highlight the growing importance of AI in corporate governance by classifying its gradual levels of autonomy vis-à-vis the board of directors. Then, this paper proceeds to make a preliminary legal analysis of the potential roles of AI in the management of memberless entities, leaderless entities and traditional corporations. The strongest focus of this paper lies on fundamental questions of corporate law pertaining to the delegation of decision rights to AI, the full replacement of human directors by AI, the required human supervision of AI and the attribution of liability for algorithmic failure.